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 1 
THE GREAT UNIFIER: FORM AND THE UNITY OF THE ORGANISM 
David S. Oderberg 
Abstract  
Organisms possess a special unity that biologists have long recognized and that 
cries out for explanation. Organs and collectives also have their own related kinds 
of unity, so what distinguishes the unity of the organism? I argue that only 
substantial form, a central plank of hylemorphic metaphysics, can provide the 
explanation we need. I set out the idea that whilst organisms possess substantial 
form, organs abtain the substantial form of the organisms they belong to, and 
collectives contain the substantial forms of their organismic members. I consider a 
number of difficult cases, including lichens, biofilms, cellular slime moulds, and 
plasmodial slime moulds, arguing that none of them pose a serious threat to the 
threefold distinction between organ, organism, and collective. I conclude by 
arguing that two prominent, alternative unity principles for organisms do not 
work, thus giving indirect support to the need for substantial form. 
 
 
1. Introduction: the unity problem 
In his monumental treatise On Growth and Form, the famous mathematical 
biologist D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson commented as follows: ‘The biologist, as 
well as the philosopher, learns to recognise that the whole is not merely the sum 
of its parts. It is this, and much more than this. For it is not a bundle of parts but 
an organisation of parts, of parts in their mutual arrangement, fitting one with 
another, in what Aristotle calls “a single and indivisible principle of unity”; and 
this is no merely metaphysical conception, but is in biology [a] fundamental 
truth…’.1 
The kind of unity to which Thompson is referring – the organisational 
harmony of interacting parts – is a phenomenon we find both within and 
without biology. The unity of chemical compounds, of an atom, a molecule, of a 
                                            
1 Thompson (1945): 1019. 
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lump of iron or uranium, is also a subject of wonder, a phenomenon asking for 
an explanation. In biology, however, as Thompson makes clear, following 
Aristotle before him, there is a special kind of unity. Terence Irwin puts it thus 
when commenting on Aristotle’s discussion of animal souls:2 ‘…a collection of 
flesh and bones constitutes a single living organism in so far as it is teleologically 
organized; the activities of the single organism are the final cause of the 
movements of the different parts.’3 
For the many philosophers who reflexively recoil at talk of teleology and 
final causes, the idea can be put in a different yet familiar way: organisms act for 
their own sustenance, maintenance, and development. Their parts all serve the 
overall goal of the organism’s flourishing. The organism, unless it has reason, 
does not set itself this goal; and even rational animals such as ourselves do not set 
every element of our goal of flourishing as human beings: much of what we do is 
no more than what happens to us or consists of the processes we inevitably 
undergo for our own sustenance, maintenance, and development. Yet the goal is 
there, however we got it and however any organism of any kind got it. Using 
more traditional terminology, I claim that organisms display immanent causation: 
causation that originates with an agent and terminates in that agent for the sake 
of its self-perfection. By ‘self-perfection’ I do not mean that there is some ideal type 
that every organism strives to reach. The idea is far more modest – namely that 
every organism aims, whether consciously or not, at the fulfilment of its 
potentialities such that it achieves a good state of being, indeed the best state it 
                                            
2 De Anima I.5, 411a24-b30, Ross (1931). 
3 Irwin (1988): 288. 
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can reach given the limitations of its kind and its environment. Immanent 
causation is a kind of teleology, but metaphysically distinctive in what it involves. 
It is not just action for a purpose, but for the agent’s own purpose, where ‘own 
purpose’ means not merely that the agent acts for a purpose it possesses, but that 
it acts for a purpose it possesses such that fulfilment of the purpose contributes 
to the agent’s self- perfection.  
This unity cries out for explanation. There is, as I have already implied, a 
‘unity problem’ for all substances, organic and inorganic:4 to put it crudely, what 
holds their essences together?5 This has also been called the ‘problem of complex 
essences’, in other words the question of ‘the linkage of inherently separable 
components into a single kind-essence’.6 A typical example is the electron: it 
shares its unit negative charge with the tau lepton but not its mass; it shares its 
mass with the positron but not its charge. The same applies to organisms: the 
flying squirrel (tribe Pteromyini) and sugar glider (species Petaurus breviceps) share a 
gliding membrane but not a pouch; the latter shares a pouch with the kangaroo 
(genus Macropus) but not a gliding membrane. The properties I have mentioned 
are all essential:7 they are partially definitive of the things to which they belong. 
Yet they are also really distinct: they are separately instantiated in different kinds 
of thing yet co-instantiated in others. When they are found together, what holds 
                                            
4 I set out the unity problem in Oderberg (2007), and much of the subsequent defence of 
hylemorphism is designed to solve it. 
5 A non-essentialist version is: what holds their natures together? In the latter case, there 
is no implication about the modal status of a thing’s nature. I presume essentialism in what 
follows, without requiring it as part of my solution to the unity problem. 
6 Dumsday (2010): 620. 
7 Strictly, there is a difference between the constituents of a thing’s essence and the 
essential properties (‘necessary accidents’) that flow from that essence, but for the present 
discussion I treat the two kinds similarly and call them all ‘essential properties’. For more, see 
Oderberg (2011). 
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them together? In the case of organisms the unity problem is even more acute 
than in the inorganic case, since not only are there distinct yet co-instantiated 
essential properties, but these properties all subserve the organism’s overall 
flourishing, and the organism itself seeks to bring about its overall flourishing by 
employing its own parts, powers and other characteristics. In other words the 
organism, by engaging in immanent causation, displays a further kind of unity 
beyond the harmony and integration of its parts. 
Now the immediate objection one is likely to raise is that there is no 
unity problem, only a pseudo-problem. What could it mean for essential 
properties to be ‘held’ together other than that, in a given case, they are 
properties belonging to the same essence? This seems to be the view of Jonathan 
Lowe, for whom the particular but regular combination of powers and liabilities 
in members of a given kind consists in the fact that, precisely, the objects in 
question are members of a given kind and that kinds are real universals8. 
Although this account, as Lowe points out, reduces the number of  brute facts 
that must be countenanced compared to nominalism, brutes facts there are 
nevertheless. It might be thought I am unfair to Lowe here, since he also holds 
that kinds are governed by laws linking them with their attributes, which adds 
some depth, as it were, to the bruteness.9 But Lowe’s official view of laws is that 
they consist in the characterisation of kinds by attributes,10 so no new information 
is added to the account. What if one had a different view of laws, say that they 
involved some sort of metaphysical determination or production; on such a view, 
                                            
8 Lowe (2006): 161. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid: 141. 
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one would hold that the essential behaviour or operation of members of a kind 
was governed by the essence of the kind. One might say that kangaroos nurse 
their young in a pouch because this is metaphysically necessitated by their 
essence. But even so, this cannot account for all essential properties. Since having 
a pouch and having a flying membrane can come apart, there cannot be a law 
uniting them if the law involves necessitation. But if the law is contingent, what 
kind of law is it? If it is a law of biology, what law? If metaphysical, how can it be 
contingent? Further, kangaroos are essentially mammals, but it is hardly a law 
that they are mammals in any sense beyond that being a mammal is part of the 
essence of being a kangaroo. Similarly, it is not a law that electrons have negative 
unit charge: it’s just part of what it is to be an electron.11 
Attempting to explain unity in terms of laws is bound to fail. Taking it to 
be a brute fact is also unacceptable. There is a difference, or so it seems, between 
an organism and an organ, on the one hand, and on the other between an 
organism and a collective of which it is a member, such as a colony.12 That is why 
appealing simply to immanent causation is insufficient to mark out organisms as 
a unique category of living thing. Organs, too, work for their own self-perfection: 
consider homeostasis within the organism, self-repair, intake of nutrients, and so 
on. An organ13 has a similar unity to the organism of which it is a part – call it, 
for now, tight. Yet the organ is subservient to the organism in a way that the 
organism is not subservient to anything. Again, many collectives – consider ant 
                                            
11 Here I side with Bird (2007): 208-9 against Lowe (2006):154. 
12 As Clarke (2010): 316 puts it, in the context of the ‘problem of biological individuality’, 
the task is to focus ‘on what properties separate living individuals from living parts and from 
living groups, while taking the property of life itself for granted.’ 
13 By which I mean any biologically identifiable part of an organism rather than a random 
or gerrymandered hunk of tissue or other organic material. 
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and bee colonies, among many others – also work for their self-perfection. Unless 
we merely stipulate – which seems ad hoc – that immanent causation excludes 
this kind of colonial collective agency, we should accept that living collectives, 
too, display immanent causation. By contrast with the organ, however, a 
collective has a similar unity to the organism that is a member of it inasmuch as 
neither are subservient to anything in the way the organ is subservient to the 
organism. But the collective’s unity is loose. So the organ’s unity is tight but 
subservient, the collective’s is loose but not subservient, and the organism’s is 
tight but not subservient. What is the metaphysical explanation of these 
differences? 
In what follows I explore and defend the traditional distinction between 
organs, organisms, and collectives by utilising Aristotelian conceptual tools that 
have, for one reason or another, fallen out of favour. Along the way I will 
consider a number (though by no means all) of the hard cases that have been 
raised in the literature as a possible threat to this tripartite metaphysical 
distinction. The pivotal concept for clarifying and defending it is that of 
substantial form, which is where I begin the analysis. 
 
2. Form as unifying principle 
The Aristotelian hylemorphist claims that the differences are to be accounted for 
in terms of form, more precisely substantial form. Forms are universal determining 
principles whereby things are endowed with substantial natures and accidental 
characteristics. Are forms just what we call universals? It depends what one 
means by ‘universal’. There are a number of things that can be said here, but for 
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my purpose the main point is that there are universal forms, whether of 
substance or of accident, but the former should not be thought of as kinds along 
the lines of, say, Lowe’s four-category ontology,14 except by way of synecdoche, 
inasmuch as having a substantial form entails membership of a substantial kind. 
There is the form of the Eastern Gray Kangaroo (Macropus giganteus), which 
determines the animals that have it to be in a corresponding substantial kind. 
Being in a substantial kind is, so to speak, part of what it is to have a substantial 
form. But the form is not the kind, as seen by the fact that on the hylemorphic 
theory there is only one substantial form per substance – the famous doctrine of 
the unicity of form – whereas every substance instantiates more than one kind. 
Boxer the Easter Gray Kangaroo has the single form of the Eastern Gray Kangaroo 
but instantiates numerous kinds such as that of, once again, Eastern Gray Kangaroo 
but also the kind marsupial and the kind mammal. Membership in all the higher 
metaphysical genera is explained by the substantial form inasmuch as there are 
real features possessed by Boxer, in virtue of his form, that are shared by 
marsupials and mammals that are not Eastern Gray Kangaroos. But these various 
groupings of features are abstractions from Boxer’s form and from the form of any 
other Eastern Gray Kangaroo, among other infima or lowest species, again to use 
the hylemorphic terminology. There is no space to defend the unicity of form 
here;15 I raise it only to clarify the difference between form and kind. 
As well as substantial forms there are accidental forms, such as being 
cloven-hoofed, and these too are universals. Kinds of substances, being universals, 
                                            
14 Lowe (2006). 
15 I defend the doctrine in Oderberg (2007): ch. 4.2. 
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have multiple instances – individual substances such as mammals. Accidental 
forms have particular accidents as their instances, now called tropes but 
traditionally called modes; cases of cloven-hoofedness are an example. These 
universals exist both in the mind and in reality, the difference being that in the 
mind the universal exists as a single, unified idea, whereas outside the mind the 
universal exists as multiplied: it exists in its instances or, to use Lewis’s well-known 
and apt description, it is ‘wholly present wherever and whenever it is 
instantiated.’16 In other words, although the selfsame universal is wholly present 
in each instance, it is multiplied in the sense of having multiple instances.17 The 
same goes for substantial forms: they are grasped as unified ideas by the mind, 
but in reality they are multiplied in their instances, which are particularised forms. 
The form of Skippy the Eastern Gray Kangaroo is the same as that of Boxer the 
Eastern Gray Kangaroo inasmuch as they share the universal form of that species, 
which explains their belonging to the correlative universal kind. Whereas 
substantial kinds have substances as instances, however, substantial forms have 
particular forms as instances. Skippy and Boxer have different particular forms 
inasmuch as each possesses its own principle of unity, which is also the principle 
of its specificity as a certain kind of kangaroo, and this because, and as surely as, 
they are each a distinct, individual kangaroo. We can see now that for the 
hylemorphist, while in many respects forms – henceforth I mean substantial forms 
unless otherwise indicated – are on a par with other universals, the former 
nevertheless do their own metaphysical work. 
                                            
16 Lewis (1986): 202. 
17 For more on this, see Oderberg (2007): ch.4.5. 
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Our concern is with form’s work as the unifier of an organism – an 
individual living substance. The first thing that needs to be appreciated is that 
this is not strictly a scientific but a metaphysical matter. Form is not a scientific 
postulate but a metaphysical one. One way of thinking of it as an organising 
principle, where by ‘principle’ I mean, as the scholastic philosophers did in this 
context, a real, objective cause of something’s being the kind of thing it is, what 
Aristotelians call a ‘formal cause’. Not every cause is efficient, on this picture of 
reality: form as organising principle is a cause in the sense of being 
metaphysically responsible for something’s having a certain nature. As such, 
form – the formal cause – is not the sort of thing a biologist or any other natural 
scientist could ever discover. What they discover are the kinds of things there are, 
to be sure, but they do not discover that form is responsible for the essential 
unity of any kind of thing, either as a kind or as an instance of a kind.  
Biologists have not and could not discover the existence of form any more 
than a physicist could discover, or ever did discover, the existence of matter. It is 
through properly philosophical reflection that we know such things must exist. 
Without going into detail here, matter is known to us as the metaphysical 
principle of change and potentiality. What we, either as ordinary observers or 
scientists, know are the particular material objects that exist. What we know 
philosophically is that that they have something in common that is the permanent 
substrate, to put it tendentiously, of their change and powers. So matter, as 
understood in purely metaphysical terms, is not the everyday matter we bump 
into when we interact with different kinds of thing. It is a metaphysical posit 
without which, claims the Aristotelian, insoluble philosophical problems arise, 
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and which underlies the everyday matter of our common experience. The same 
goes for form. We know philosophically that substances have something in 
common that is responsible for their unity and specificity, but we know through 
observation, whether ordinary or scientific, the particular forms of substances 
that exist. So on this score the by-now stale derision of substantial forms that we 
have inherited from Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume et al. can be seen to be far 
less compelling than most philosophers, raised in these these post-scholastic 
world views, have thought. Put another way – and quite gesturally, I accept18 – 
the early modern rejection of substantial forms owes more to anti-scholastic 
prejudice, in my view, than to irresistible philosophical critique.19 
We should, however, only postulate form as a metaphysical principle if it 
can do work in explaining the unity that needs explaining. What I want to focus 
on here is that aspect of unity whereby an organism is clearly neither an organ 
nor a collective of substances, be they other organisms or anything else. I take 
this to be intuitively clear even if the boundaries between organs, organisms, and 
collectives are hard to draw. One might object that we have no pre-theoretical 
intuition as to the special metaphysical status of the organism; I take it that John 
Dupré would agree, espousing as he does a pluralistic account of the ways in 
which cells ‘combine to form integrated biological wholes’.20 Multicellularity, he 
goes on to say, comes in many varieties, and we should not think of the organism 
                                            
18 For the detailed response to sceptical worries about substantial form, and an equally 
detailed defence, see Oderberg (2007). 
19 The interested reader may also like to consult Oderberg (2012) for a somewhat 
unorthodox exposure of Hume’s prejudice against the scholastic theory of substance. 
20 Dupré (2012): 88. 
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in a ‘naïve and static way’ as a ‘living individual’. It is, rather, a ‘process’ or ‘life 
cycle’.21 
Yet is the intuition so easy to dismiss? It cannot be a scientific discovery 
that the intuition does or does not latch onto reality: who made the discovery one 
way or the other? Biologists have, to be sure, discovered all kinds of unicellular 
entities as well as multicellular organisation, but no biologist discovered – or 
could discover – that there is no difference in kind between organisms as living 
individual substances, organs that are material parts subservient to organisms, 
and aggregates of which organisms are members. The difference between parts of 
substances, substances, and aggregates of which substances are members cuts 
across the entire ontological realm: it is not special to biology but reflects the way 
the world in general is organised. And here we have the first philosophical 
argument in favour of the intuition: that if these categories are instantiated 
universally outside biology, we should expect them to be found within biology as 
well. Moreover, given the special teleologically-loaded unity of the living world, 
we should expect the division to be even more pronounced than in the world of 
the inorganic. We should be able to identify parts by the service they render to the 
whole, the whole by its integral teleology and hence the service rendered to it by 
its parts, and the aggregate by the service rendered to it by its substantial 
members. 
The second philosophical argument for the intuition is very simple: it just 
seems, from both common and scientific observation, that there are many 
                                            
21 Ibid: 99. 
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instances of organs, organisms, and collectives or aggregates22 and that the 
categories are mutually exclusive for those instances. And, to paraphrase Richard 
Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity, things usually are the way they appear to 
be.23 Now perhaps the most common way of rejecting the intuition is by appeal 
to vagueness, which is effectively what a pluralist such as Dupré is doing when 
he points out, quite correctly, the multifarious ways in which multicellularity 
presents itself. The vagueness, to be of any power against the intuition, needs to 
be ontic. But assuming it is, there are two responses one might be tempted to 
make and yet which I recommend resisting in the case of the organic world even 
if, as I am happy to accept, they can be deployed in the inorganic case. One is to 
point out that vagueness is everywhere and appealing to it is often a cheap shot. 
We all want to solve the problems of vagueness. We learn nothing special about 
biology when we see that we can soritify biological predicates like ‘…is an 
organism’ as much as any others. Another response is the Johnsonian one:24 the 
existence of twilight does not mean we cannot distinguish between day and 
night. If there are clear ontic intermediaries between organs, organisms, and 
collectives then to insist upon the importance of these three while ignoring the 
in-between cases is to treat the latter as second-class biological citizens – curious 
departures from nature’s most important paradigms. This is to introduce 
                                            
22 I will use the terms interchangeably. 
23 Swinburne (2004): 303. 
24 Allegedly. Johnson is quoted as having said this by Anscombe (1961): 60 but I have not 
been able to find it in his works. Edmund Burke made a somewhat similar remark: ‘though no 
man can draw a stroke between the confines of day and night, yet light and darkness are upon 
the whole tolerably distinguishable’ (Thoughts on the Cause of the Present Discontents, 1770; thanks to 
Robert Koons for alerting me to this). 
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unwarranted metaphysical (and perhaps methodological) bias into what should 
be a dispassionate allocation of ontological status. 
Instead, I propose that we resist the idea that any vagueness in this 
domain is ontic. There is no promise here of an a priori, knockdown argument 
(which is not to say there mightn’t be one). I prefer an appeal to ignorance, as it 
were: what kind of thing could there be lying between the organ, the organism, 
and/or the collective? What would be its essential features? What kind of 
teleology would it manifest? Since, however, the goal of this paper is more to 
justify form rather than to prove the existence of what it explains, the questions 
will be left hanging, with the burden in my view on the opponent of my 
threefold taxonomy. Moreover, any knockdown argument, if there is one, should 
be consistent with what we find in nature, but showing this requires detailed, 
case-by-case evaluation.  
As an example, Dupré cites lichens as an case of  ‘multispecies 
organisms…symbiotic associations of photosynthetic algae or bacteria with a 
fungus’. He notes the anomalousness of such an object from the perspective of 
the ‘traditional dichotomy between unicellular organisms and monogenomic 
multicellular organisms’, adding that it is ‘quite unproblematic’ when we 
approach multicellularity from a more ‘comprehensive’ perspective.25 Now a 
relatively innocent reading of this passage reflects commitment to the special 
category of organism, but only a broadening of the category to include 
multigenomic organisms. A less innocent reading, which I adopt given the entire 
context of the chapter, is that it downgrades the category itself: after all, if there 
                                            
25 Dupré (2012): 90. 
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are even multispecies organisms, what is so special about the term ‘organism’? 
Aren’t lichens an example of the vast heterogeneity we find in living systems? 
Even if there are paradigm cases of good old-fashioned organisms such as cats, 
and of organs such as hearts and livers, and lichens are quite unlike either of 
these, this no more elevates the paradigms above our scientific and other 
interests than, recalling the earlier dictum, the existence of twilight brings out 
anything ontologically special about day and night. Let’s talk about organisms, to 
be sure; but let us not pretend we are carving nature at a privileged joint. 
In reply, lichens are not nearly as worrisome for my view as they might 
seem. They are sometimes called ‘dual organisms’ because of the symbiotic 
relation between the mycobiont (fungus) and the photobiont (green algae or 
cyanobacterium); but a dual organism is no more an organism than a dual 
carriageway is a carriageway. That a lichen behaves differently from its 
component organisms does not make it an organism since the same is true of any 
collective and it would be question-begging merely to claim that collectives are 
all organisms for the same reason lichens are. Although there are still many gaps 
in our knowledge, a lichen is usually and best regarded as a ‘miniature 
ecosystem’26 consisting of two kinds of individual organism, a fungus and an alga 
or colony of bacteria (acting as photosynthesising agents), working in extremely 
close symbiosis. As far as we know, most lichen-forming fungi, as too their 
photobionts, also occur in a free-living state in nature or can be cultivated in a 
laboratory (albeit with generally less success than as lichen components, as one 
                                            
26 Nash (2008b): 7-8; ‘minute ecosystems’ (Tuovinen et al. 2015: 130). 
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would expect).27 The fact that either partner can exist free-living distinguishes 
them metaphysically from a true organ, such as an arm, leg, or eye, that has no 
free-living state. For an organ to exist separately from its natural body, similar or 
identical bodily conditions have to be simulated. 
The other distinguishing feature is that lichen symbionts both reproduce. 
Hence to speak of lichen reproduction without qualification is misleading. There 
is genuine sexual reproduction, wherein the germinating mycobiont (fungal) 
spores have to find a suitable photobiont in the environment in order for 
successful symbiosis to arise again. Here it is the fungus that reproduces, not the 
lichen as a whole. There is also the propagation (rather than reproduction) of the 
lichen as a whole, fungus and photobionts, through the asexual reproduction of 
the fungus – the breaking off of a part of the fungus (a propagule) but containing 
photobionts within it. The fungus and the photobionts continue to grow as did 
their respective parents once a suitable environment is found. In both the sexual 
and asexual cases, the mycobiont (fungus) has its own mode of reproduction, and 
the photobiont continues to reproduce, always asexually as far as we know, in 
the mycobiont with which it is simultaneously propagated or which captures it 
following sexual reproduction. Now although many individual organisms have 
more than one mode of reproduction, none reproduces itself twice over at the 
same time, or more precisely none engages in two distinct processes of partial 
                                            
27 Putting together Tuovinen et al. (2015): 130, Friedl and Büdel (2008): 9, Honegger (2008): 
29-30, and Nash (2008b): 3, this seems to be the natural inference albeit the evidence is not 
conclusive. In other words, as far as we know, the majority of lichen photobionts are capable of 
existing in the free-living state, whether found in nature (even if only rarely) or cultured in the 
laboratory (even if only with difficulty and limited success).  
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reproduction. I take this not to be a truth of biology but of metaphysics.28 
Moreover, there would be something strange going on biologically were it to be 
that in the sexual case the fungus reproduces, not the lichen, whereas in the 
asexual case the lichen reproduces, not the fungus. It is far more economical, and 
less bizarre, to take the asexual case to be one of lichen propagation via fungal and 
photobiont reproduction. Many collectives, such as various kinds of bee or ant 
colony, propagate by splitting or budding. But if the components are themselves 
engaging in reproduction, via their own identifiable processes, it is both 
biologically obfuscatory and metaphysically quite dubious to say that the whole 
collective is itself reproducing. The very idea of reproduction itself is called into 
question. 
Returning to form, the central idea is that only an organism has a 
substantial form simpliciter: organs and collectives have them only secundum quid, 
or in a manner of speaking. It would be useful to have distinguishing terminology 
here, so I will stipulate that an organism has or possesses a substantial form, a 
collective contains one or more substantial forms, and an organ – to use an 
unfortunate neologism – abtains a substantial form. An organism has or possesses 
a substantial form inasmuch as this is its unifying principle as an individual 
substance of its essential kind. The blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus) has precisely 
the substantial form in virtue of which it is a member of that biological species. A 
collective contains one or more substantial forms inasmuch as it consists, inter 
alia, of one or more individual organisms in some systemic combination. 
                                            
28 For more on lichen reproduction, see: Paulsrud (2001); Friedl and Büdel (2008); Sarma 
(2013): 351-2; Australian National Herbarium (2012). 
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Examples include ant colonies, bacterial colonies, forests, obligate colonies such 
as corals and facultative ones such as carpenter bees (Xylocopa pubescens).29 
The abtaining of a substantial form by an organ is a trickier concept to 
grasp, but it goes a long way towards showing how substantial form acts as a 
unifying principle. I now proceed to elaborate the concept of abtaining, which 
will clarify how, ontologically, an organ is to be distinguished from an organism. 
 
3. Organs and organisms 
An organ – a term I am, to reiterate, using stipulatively to denote any biologically 
identifiable part of an organism that subserves the whole – does not have its own 
substantial form; for if it did, it would be a substance. But it is not a substance 
since substances are ontologically independent. Now there is an important 
literature on ontological independence, but I have no space or need to enter into 
a technical discussion of its definition.30 For present purposes it is enough to say 
that a substance has existence in itself and by virtue of itself as an ultimate 
distinct subject of being. This definition encompasses several notions. Substance 
has existence in itself in the sense that it is not in anything else, not a 
modification of, a part of, an aspect of, some other thing. It exists by virtue of 
itself since its continued existence does not require it to be a product or 
projection of something else. As a distinct and ultimate subject of being, it is the 
bearer of qualities but nothing bears it or is a subject of it. 
                                            
29 For carpenter bees’ facultative sociality, see Dunn and Richards (2003). 
30 See Chisholm (1994); Lowe (1994); Fine (1995); Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997). 
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An organ is clearly not encompassed by this concept of substance. It is a 
part that serves the whole, and cannot be constituted as an object with its own 
identity in a way that is metaphysically independent of that whole. To be more 
precise, we should say that something is not an organ unless either: (i) it is 
serving the whole; or (ii) is in some way able to carry out its functions as if it were 
serving a whole, such as when a heart is kept warm, pumping and oxygenated 
outside the body; or (iii) is kept in a state whereby its powers of serving the whole 
are preserved, such as when a heart is kept on ice before transplant. The first 
condition corresponds to Aristotle’s second actuality – the actual exercise of 
powers; the second to a simulated second actuality; the third to first actuality – 
having powers but not exercising them.31 I cannot see how first actuality could be 
simulated. In all three cases, the identity of the organ is still constituted by the 
function it performs with respect to the whole organism to which it belongs. As 
such, following Aristotle’s famous homonymy principle,32 an object that fulfils 
none of the above three conditions is genuinely an organ, no matter how much it 
resembles one. 
With this in view, what it means for the organ to abtain the substantial 
form of the whole is as follows. Although the organ does not have its own 
substantial form in any condition, when actually subserving an organism the 
organ is united to the whole by the substantial form. Here the organ is in its 
normal, natural state. It is thoroughly permeated by the substantial form in the 
sense that every part and property of the organ is co-opted to the service of the 
                                            
31 For Aristotle on first and second actuality, see De Anima II.5, 417a21-35, Ross (1931). 
32 Metaphysics Z:10, 1035b23 and elsewhere, Ross (1928). 
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whole (barring damage or disease). The organ has no life of its own: it is the 
metaphysical slave of the whole, forming just one part, however important, of 
the organism’s total organisation, which is dictated by the substantial form. 
We still have to explain, though, what is going on when the organ is in 
condition (ii) or (iii) above, which we can call simulation and dormancy respectively. 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz think that both cases demonstrate the existence of 
‘organic living entities’ that are neither organisms nor parts of organisms.33 This 
seems to me wrong, for it misconstrues parthood by overemphasizing the 
property of being joined to the whole. In fact Rosenkrantz, on his own account of 
whole organisms in suspended animation, allow that opponents of intermittent 
existence might plausibly construe suspended animation as involving the 
continued existence of the organism as constituted by the preservation of its 
potentiality for metabolic activity in a sense weaker than what he calls 
‘capability’.34 This looks just like the distinction between Aristotelian first 
actuality (‘second potentiality’) and second actuality referred to above. If he 
thinks it can apply to whole organisms, so he should also allow it for organs. Ad 
hominem aside, the point is that just as an organism can retain its essential 
powers in a state of dormancy or suspended animation, so too can an organ 
retain its essential powers in a similar state although detached from the whole. It 
is the retention of essential powers that is crucial, not the state of being joined. 
This is what unites the dormancy case to the simulation case, the only difference 
                                            
33 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1999): 87, n.13. 
34 Rosenkrantz (2013): 95. 
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being that in simulation the organ actually exercises some or all of its powers, 
albeit in a way that merely simulates subservience to a real organism. 
Yet how is retention of power to be reconciled with the organ’s 
essentially subservient nature? Why not count it as a substance in its own right, 
one that happens in the normal case to reside within another substance, namely 
a whole organism, but that also may not? Yet this is precisely to reject the organ’s 
essentially subservient nature, not to reconcile it with retention of power. The 
organ is a dependent entity, its very identity defined by that of which it is an 
organ. Simulation cannot be understood independently of the genuine case, and 
there is no a priori reason to consider dormancy a privilege of substances. I claim 
that the most satisfying, perhaps the only plausible, explanation of retention of 
power must appeal to the organ’s abtaining the substantial form of the whole. It 
does not have its own substantial form, but it does have many forms – accidental 
forms, as the scholastics put it. The organ is a discrete, identifiable, biologically 
significant portion of matter possessed of many accidents, the essential ones of 
which – i.e., the propria or properties in the strict sense of which – have a certain 
organisation by which the organ is defined as the kind of organ it is for the kind of 
species to whose members it normally belongs. What unifies those accidents is 
the very substantial form of the organism to which it is subservient. But given 
that the substantial form is not present in the organ, the organ must somehow 
derive or borrow the unifying power of the substantial form in one of the following 
ways.  
(i) The organ actually belongs to its connatural organism, this being the 
normal case. We might include as a deviant sub-type of (i) the case where an 
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organ is grown inside the organism’s body using the organism’s own tissue, such 
as when a person’s nose is rebuilt and grown on their forehead.35 One might 
legitimately wonder, though, whether such an entity fails to satisfy any of the 
three necessary conditions for being an organ stated earlier, and hence does not 
merit being called a nose at all until it is moved to its proper place. (ii) The organ 
once belonged to its connatural organism at some prior time. An organ removed 
from an organism and still satisfying the dormancy or simulation conditions 
would be a typical case of (ii). (iii) The organ has come into existence via a causal 
process that began with a distinct organ satisfying (i) or (ii). Case (iii) covers organs 
synthesised from other organs (such as cells – recall my stipulative use of the 
term ‘organ’) belonging or having belonged to a connatural organism. An 
example of (iii) would be currently typical organ synthesis, where the organ is 
grown outside the organism’s body using detached cells from the latter, say a 
liver cultured in a lab from the organism’s stem cells. In case (iii) the organ still 
abtains its unity from the organism, but only indirectly via some other organ that 
abtains it directly. 
Now to many this way of explaining the difference between an organ and 
an organism will seem to partake of the kind of metaphysics that gives 
metaphysics a bad name. This is unfortunate and short-sighted. It is unfortunate 
because it bespeaks a refusal to engage seriously with hylemorphic metaphysics , 
free of the anti-scholastic prejudices of a bygone age. It is short-sighted because it 
reflects a preoccupation with surface illusions rather than the depth of the 
                                            
35 See http://www.rhinoplastyinseattle.com/blog/updates-and-analysis/post/can-a-plastic-
surgeon-really-grow-a-nose-on-a-forehead. 
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position. On the surface, the idea that an organ might ‘abtain’ a substantial form 
looks like ‘spooky metaphysics’ involving ‘occult qualities’ akin to the ‘dormitive 
virtues’ mocked by Molière. Yet one also might wonder how a universal can be 
wholly present wherever and whenever it is instantiated, how any parts can 
compose a whole, how real causal influence can be transmitted from one thing to 
another; and the list goes on. All such things have been wondered about, and 
many more; if the wonder seems insuperable, one adopts the appropriate 
position, whether nominalism, or compositional nihilism, or regularity theory, 
and so on. Quite why the scholastic framework or any of its key posits should be 
treated as of special concern because of its particularly ‘spooky’ nature is itself a 
matter for wonder.36 
The real focus needs to be on whether a given posit can explain 
something that needs to be explained, in a way that is not ad hoc or incoherent. I 
don’t see either criticism applying here, but that is where the opponent needs to 
concentrate their energy. Substantial form as unifier is clearly a metaphysical 
posit: I claim that we must acknowledge its existence if we are to explain the 
unity of the organism and its different metaphysical status from the organ and 
from the collective. It would be quite mistaken to think of form as a kind of 
suprasensible metaphysical ‘glue’ that holds the organism together, something 
we need special scholastic spectacles to ‘see’. We do not see substantial form and 
we do not ‘see’ it either. On my position, we know that it must exist or we have 
no explanation of unity. But to postulate form as no more than that which unifies 
                                            
36 In Oderberg (2007) I give an extensive defence of the same viewpoint in the context of 
biology (and some physics). 
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would be ad hoc: claiming simply that we need a unifier to explain unity borders 
on the tautologous, but this is something no scholastic has ever said. Substantial 
form not only unifies, it determines the identity of a substance, it actualises matter, 
it is a principle of identity and stability in a substance, and more. In other words, 
it is a key element in an entire metaphysical picture. Needless to say, devotees of 
Quinean ‘desert landscapes’ will have no time for form, but they will have no 
time for universals, substances, powers, and much else besides. To single out 
form as having a special mystery about it is the opposite of special pleading, what 
we might call special prosecution. 
Having defended, by appeal to form, the distinction between organs and 
organisms, I move now to the other part of the tripartite distinction – between 
organisms and collectives. Here the issues seem to me less subtle, though there 
are still important empirical challenges to the sharpness of the distinction. Once 
again, the appeal to form will show that the distinction is both plausible and 
clear cut. 
 
4. Organisms and collectives 
Although collectives come in many kinds, as noted above, what they have in 
common – at least in biology – is their consisting of one or more organisms in 
some sort of systemic relation (whether including or excluding non-substances 
such as an ecological niche or organismically-produced tools or habitats). This, I 
argued earlier, is how we should understand lichens.  
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Yet the idea of a ‘superorganism’ has found its way into the literature, 
and as Michael Ghiselin notes it has become a recent fad.37 He himself has done 
much to counter some of the excesses found in employment of the concept.38 
Unreflective comparisons between, say, an organism’s eyes and the combined 
eyes of an insect colony’s members, or between an organism’s skin and a colony’s 
nest, do not withstand scrutiny.39 The argument that collectives must be 
organisms because natural selection works on organisms as well as on collectives 
is an elementary fallacy.40 As far as the historical debate goes, I am on the side of 
those who regard the idea that collectives are literally a kind of organism as ‘bad 
metaphysics’41 or as consisting of ‘poetic metaphors in scientific guise’.42 
That said, for my purposes the main idea to keep in focus is that 
collectives contain substantial forms but do not possess them. It is not that we can 
appeal to substantial forms to demonstrate that there is a difference between 
organisms and collectives, but that given the distinction, only forms can explain 
it. Pointing to a list of disanalogies will not do the job: superorganism theory has 
long had a ‘magnetic appeal’43 precisely because of the many analogies that can be 
found between the two kinds, in terms of such phenomena as selection (at 
individual and group level) and division of labour. Even if the disanalogies 
overwhelmed the analogies, we would still not have arrived at an explanation. For, 
we should ask, why the disanalogies? Disanalogies point to a significant 
                                            
37 Ghiselin (2011). 
38 Such as in Hölldobler and Wilson (2009). 
39 Ghiselin (2011): 163. 
40 I agree with Ghiselin (2011): 153 that this is the ‘basic thrust’ of the complex argument 
of Wilson and Sober (1989). 
41 Ghiselin (2011): 153. 
42 Wilson and Sober (1989): 338, speaking of many versions of the superorganism theory. 
43 Ibid: 338. 
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difference; they do not explain it. For an explanation, we must engage 
metaphysically: organisms are unified by a single substantial form that 
constitutes them as an individual substance. An ant colony’s behaviour, for all its 
beguiling resemblances to multicellular co-operation in an organism, does not 
reflect the existence of a unifying form, since the colony contains substantial 
forms already – those found in the individual ants. But if the ants have their own 
substantial forms, this excludes a further, superorganismal form. Why? Couldn’t 
one object that the superorganismal form can be superimposed on the individual 
ant forms, such that the ants each have their own form and the plurality itself has 
a colonial substantial form?  
The objection fails. For assume the existence of the individual forms and 
the superorganismal, colonial substantial form. The colony would itself be a 
substance and the ants would be its parts. But the parts of an organism – the 
organs, as I am calling them – are, as set out earlier, essentially subservient, 
ontologically dependent entities whose very identity is defined by the organism of 
which they are parts. Putting it loosely, there is no such thing as a heart 
simpliciter, only the heart of a lion, of a man, or of a reptile. Organs are defined 
by the organisms they subserve. So the ants would be defined by the 
superorganism they subserve. But they cannot be, since – ex hypothesi – they 
already have their own substantial forms as ants; and they are defined by these.  
They certainly don’t have an extra substantial form, namely the colonial form, 
since this would absurdly imply that each ant was a colony. The colonial form is 
supposed to be the form of the plurality of ants yet also function so as to define 
each individual ant as an organ of the colony. In other words, the individual ant 
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is supposed both to possess its own substantial form and abtain another 
substantial form. It is, then, supposed to be both ontologically independent and 
ontologically dependent; and this is a contradiction. 
So, on the substantial forms view, we either have to deny that the ant is a 
substance or deny that the colony is a substance. It is clear what we must do. 
Denying that the ant is an individual substance is a non-starter, unless we deny 
that there are any individual substances at all – not a position I am questioning 
here. If anything is an individual substance an ant is, since it displays all the 
hallmarks of ontological independence. What it is, its quiddity, is in no way 
defined by reference to colonies in general or any colony in particular. An 
account of how ants behave, of course, must make reference to necessary colony 
formation (albeit, note, not for facultatively colonial organisms44), but this is not 
the same as defining an ant as a kind of organism with its distinctive and 
independent physiology, anatomy, developmental processes, and so on – all of 
which constitute its immanent causal behaviour, and none of which require 
defining it in terms of its colonial behaviour, whatever the causal connections 
between the two. 
We are faced, then, with the obvious and only remaining move, which is 
to deny that the colony is a substance. It is ontologically dependent inasmuch as 
the kind of thing it is depends, metaphysically, on the kinds of organism that 
belong to it, each having its own independent physiology, anatomy, 
                                            
44 Should the superorganism theorist say that facultative colonies are not superorganisms 
whereas obligate colonies are? Why? After all, the colonial behaviour is the same, yet in 
facultative colonies the organisms are quite liable to disperse and live their own substantial lives. 
To maintain in the face of this that the obligate colonies are still superorganisms looks like a 
manoeuvre with no independent motivation. 
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developmental processes, and so on. This is quite different from the substantial 
members of the aggregate, whose identities as the kinds of thing they are do not 
depend metaphysically on their membership of the aggregate. This is so even if it 
is essential to a given substance to be a member of an aggregate. Now it is not for 
the metaphysician to say what aggregates there are any more than what 
substances there are: this is for the biologist, and hence is a wholly a posteriori 
matter. What the metaphysician can say, however, is that we should expect there 
to be a sharp division between substances and aggregates because they are 
distinct metaphysical categories; so-called borderline cases should reflect our 
investigative limitations rather than a blurriness of the categories. 
We see this sharpness, I submit, in the supposed borderline cases of 
biofilms and slime moulds. A biofilm, at its most general, is a colony of bacteria 
adhering to a surface and often to each other, producing an extracellular 
polymeric substance (EPS) that acts as a matrix holding the colony together, 
protecting it against predators and toxins, helping to digest and pass on nutrients 
to the colonists, and facilitating communication between them.45 Slime moulds, 
on the other hand, are a paraphyletic class of protists that form masses of 
protoplasm containing one or more nuclei and reproduce by means of spores 
emanating from sporangia, much like plants and many fungi.46 There is much 
that we do not know about biofilms and slime moulds, making interpretation of 
their natures a difficult matter. One might wonder, however, whether they give 
credence to the idea of a superorganism constituted by other organisms. There is 
                                            
45 For the details, see Romeo (ed.) (2008) 
46 For more on slime moulds, see Stephenson and Stempen (1994) [plasmodial] and Bonner 
(2009) [cellular]. 
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far too much to be said about slime moulds and biofilms to be anything other 
than cursory here, but a few remarks are in order. 
It is difficult to see biofilms as anything but extraordinarily close-knit 
colonies of individual organisms. All biologists, as far as I can tell, refer to them 
as such47 or as ‘communities’48 or with similar terminology. Virtually all bacteria 
can form biofilms,49 and yet all live quite happily in the planktonic state unless 
either stressed by lack of nutrients or the presence of toxins, or attracted by a 
suitable surface. The bacteria within the biofilm maintain their cellular integrity. 
The biofilm forms precisely through the colonisation of a surface by free-living 
bacteria. It grows by the reproduction of the bacteria themselves and the addition 
of new bacteria. The biofilm does not itself reproduce, it disperses by the 
detachment of the bacteria from the colony, their movement to a new location, 
and reattachment to a new substrate. The bacteria themselves produce enzymes 
that degrade the EPS or the substrate. Some biofilms undergo ‘seeding dispersal’, 
whereby hollow cavities in the matrix fill with planktonic bacteria that then 
breach the colony wall and emerge to form new colonies.50 
Nevertheless, Ereshefsky and Pedroso argue that biofilms are ‘individuals 
and not merely communities’, by which they mean individual organisms.51 
Without going into the detail of their own account, note for example their 
contrast between biofilms and ‘symbiotic complexes, such as the symbiotic 
relation between ants and acacias…Bacteria in a biofilm exchange genetic 
                                            
47 E.g. Romeo (ed.) (2008) passim, Karatan and Watnick (2009). 
48 Kaplan (2010). 
49 Karatan and Watnick (2009). 
50 See Kaplan (2010) for the details. 
51 Ereshefsky and Pedroso (2016). 
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content; ant/acacia symbionts do not.’52 This lateral gene transfer is taken by 
them to be one of many markers of individuality since it facilitates 
communication betweent the bacteria and hence development of the colony, 
especially the EPS as a boundary between the colony and its environment. Yet 
although they make the contrast with lack of LGT in ant/acacia symbiosis they 
also refer to a supposed lack of LGT in aphid/bacteria symbionts. In support of the 
latter, they cite a paper in which the authors find no evidence of LGT between 
the pea aphid (Acyrthosiphon pisum) and its obligate mutualist 
Gammaproteobacteria (Buchnera aphidicola). Yet these same authors do explicitly 
suggest that there is evidence of functional gene transfer to A. pisum from prior 
rickettsial endosymbionts, given that Rickettsiales symbionts are found in some 
aphids. (Albeit the evidence is consistent also with transfer by bacterial infection 
rather than endosymbiosis.)53 So the claim that biofilms are ‘better candidates for 
biological individuals than aphid-symbiont combinations’54 in virtue of lack of 
LGT is not warranted by the evidence. 
Again, getting less technical, Ereshefsky and Pedroso are impressed by 
the way the biofilm EPS defends the bacteria, digests nutrients and passes them 
on to the bacteria, and facilitates communication between them. Yet a bee hive is 
not far away from this: it protects the bees, facilitates communication, and 
although it doesn’t digest nutrients it stores them (which is just as important as 
digestion). I am not denying the EPS is perhaps more complex than a bee hive 
(how do we measure complexity?), but what I am suggesting is that being 
                                            
52 Ibid: 109. 
53 Nikoh et al. (2010). 
54 Ereshefsky and Pedroso (2016): 108. 
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impressed by this or that marker or group of markers can cause one to lose the 
wood for the trees. A hylemorphist will look at all the characteristics of the entity 
under consideration, forming a holistic judgment as to whether the unity 
provided by substantial form is present. Anything less is bound to risk being 
skewed or arbitrary. 
The same, I submit, applies to slime moulds. In fact they come in two 
quite different kinds, the plasmodial or ‘true’ slime moulds and the cellular slime 
moulds. The cellular slime moulds have been described by the world’s expert on 
them as ‘no more than a bag of amoebae encased in a thin slime sheath’, albeit 
capable of the most remarkable behaviour ‘equal to those of animals who possess 
muscles and nerves with ganglia, that is, simple brains’. 55 The amoebae in a 
cellular slime mould retain their cell membranes. They feed and reproduce 
normally as individual amoebae as long as food is plentiful. When they begin to 
starve, they aggregate into pseudoplasmodia that produce fruiting bodies inside 
which are spores that germinate as free-living amoeba that drift to other 
locations and will remain free-living as long as conditions are favourable. Cellular 
slime moulds, then, do not strictly reproduce: they have a fungus-like property of 
sporulation that produces yet more free-living amoebae, but fungal spores are 
juvenile fungal parts that germinate into the vegetative mycelium or fungal body.  
For all their amazing behaviour, cellular slime moulds are rightly 
designated as not true slime moulds. They are, in my view, tightly integrated 
colonies, much like biofilms. Their motility, chemotaxis, direction-finding 
                                            
55 Bonner (2009, Kindle edition): ch.5, ‘Behavior of Multicellular Slugs’. 
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behaviour, and the like, can all be found in colonies and swarms constituted by 
birds, bees, fish and other animals. 
Plasmodial slime moulds, the true slime moulds (Myxomycetes), do by 
contrast appear to be genuine individual organisms. The constituent amoebae do 
not retain their individual membranes, but instead mass into a single-celled, 
multinucleate plasmodium. Reproduction is also typically by sporulation, but 
here the spores are either haploid gametes that later fuse with suitable gamete 
partners to form the juvenile plasmodium via a zygote, or (less commonly) the 
diploid zygotes themselves. The zygotes grow into plasmodia through repeated 
nuclear (but not cellular) division. The entire life cycle seems to instantiate the 
growth and reproductive pattern of an individual organism, with no entities 
within the single-celled plasmodium that correspond to potential free-living 
amoebae. 
There is much more to say, and much more to be known, about the 
various kinds of entity that might challenge the idea of a sharp boundary 
between organisms, organs, and collectives. So far I have made out a positive case 
for the distinction’s plausibility, utilising substantial form. I want, however, to 
return to more foundational issues by means of a negative argument. If we grant 
that the unity of the organism is what marks it out from the organ on one side 
and the collective on the other, why must we go so far as to posit substantial 
form? Mightn’t a lesser principle of unity be sufficient for the task? If some of the 
leading candidates for such a principle are not successful we will have further, 
indirect reason at least to think that only a principle as strong as substantial form 
can do the required work. 
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4. Lesser unity principles will not work 
An objection to substantial form that no doubt arises in many minds is 
that they seem redundant. Why couldn’t I say everything I have about organs and 
collectives, contrasting them with organisms, without even mentioning 
substantial forms? Why not simply talk about substances and non-substances? 
Aren’t substantial forms an ontological spare wheel? In reply, as I have already 
argued, there must be a principle of unity for substances – that which unifies 
otherwise disparate elements into a whole. If that principle is to have ontological 
reality, it must be either a substantial form or something else. So to underscore 
the reality of form we should consider alternative unity principles to see if they 
can do the required work. I want to look briefly at two alternatives, and will 
argue that both are found wanting. The first is that of Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz,56 who have a complex account of organismic unity in terms of 
functional organization, one which also requires the existence of a ‘master part’ 
that controls the processes of all the other parts. Details of their specific account 
of functional organisation aside, their basic, quite Aristotelian idea is that 
organisms are functionally united in such a way that their parts subserve or 
contribute to the typical life processes of growth, metabolism, development, 
and/or reproduction. As such, however, there is no distinction between organs, 
organisms, and collectives, given especially that they do not propose these basic 
life processes to be necessary and sufficient for any living thing. Hence organisms 
cannot be singled out by some privileged set of life processes. 
                                            
56 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997), (1999); Rosenkrantz (2013). 
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What does single out organisms, according to Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 
is that they must have a ‘master part’ that controls and regulates their processes. 
They, like I do, take it as a datum that organisms are not proper parts of other 
living things whereas organs are parts of organisms, but they seek to explain this 
terms of the organism’s processes’ being controlled by its master part, which 
excludes the organism’s being functionally subordinate to another living entity. A 
part of an organism, such as a liver cell, is functionally subordinate to the 
organism and its life processes are controlled by the organism’s master part, 
either directly or indirectly. Hence the nucleus of the liver cell is not its master 
part. 
The implied argument for the master part thesis is precisely that 
anything less won’t make the right distinctions: mere functional unity, however 
complex, is too coarse grained to do the work they require.57 Although they don’t 
put it this way, it would be a miracle were there to be a special kind of functional 
unity that applied to all and only organisms. The explicit argument, however, is 
one by induction from observed cases of paradigmatic organisms. Eukaryotic 
single-celled organisms seem to have the nucleus as a ‘highly centralised 
regulatory system’ and prokaryotes have the system of their DNA and mRNA 
molecules. If a proteinoid microsphere were an organism, its protein chains 
would constitute its master part.58 The (central) nervous system of an ‘adult 
vertebrate’ is its master part, as are the roots, stem and leaves of a ‘typical mature 
                                            
57 As Clarke (2010): 316 perceptively puts it in the context of ‘functional integration’ 
accounts of individuality: ‘The trouble is that pretty much everything is organized, in some sense. 
… [T]here are many respects and degrees to which functional integration is evident in systems we 
clearly don’t want to describe as biological individuals.’ 
58 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1997): 126-7. 
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plant’,59 as well as the nerve net of a jellyfish, the nucleoid of a bacterium, and 
the ‘nuclear system’ of a plasmodial slime mould.60 
This approach seems to me wrongheaded, for it leads to Rosenkrantz’s 
view that the master part of a plant is all of the plant minus its sap, since the sap 
appears to be the only part that does not control the plant’s life functions. He 
calls the plant minus its sap a ‘decentralized’ master part without showing how 
to distinguish between centralized and decentralized master parts. Yet I submit 
this is to abuse the term ‘part’, since for biological purposes the plant minus its 
sap is no more a proper part of the plant that is Tibbles minus his tail. Moreover, 
before a vertebrate embryo gastrulates61 there is nothing resembling a nervous 
system to serve as master part, yet there is still an organism. Furthermore, what 
on their master-part theory of organisms is to be said about non-vascular plants 
such as algae and bryophytes, all of which lack sap? Are we to say that they are 
their own master parts? After all, if we want to justify the idea that, say, the 
‘nuclear system’ of a plasmodial slime mould is a master part simply because it is 
a proper part according to extensional mereology (not that Rosenkrantz and 
Hoffman say that, but it is an obvious move), why not hold that non-vascular 
plants are their own improper master parts? All in all, it seems that the master-
part theory is unacceptably hostage to empirical fortune when it comes to 
defining the organism. 
                                            
59 Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (1999): 96. 
60 Rosenkrantz (2013): 97-8. Gratifyingly, they come to the same view as I do about slime 
moulds, namely that plasmodial slime moulds are organisms but cellular slime moulds are ‘ a 
collective of “social” unicellular organisms’. 
61 Gastrulation is the reorganisation of the hollow sphere of cells (blastula) to a three-
layered gastrula. In human embryos this occurs at around sixteen days. 
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The other unity principle I briefly want to mention is structure, as 
exemplified in the work of Kathrin Koslicki.62 She holds that we need something 
like substantial form to act as a scientifically respectable analogue of a 
metaphysically discreditable idea. So she proposes structure – a perfectly natural 
and understandable thought. Moreover, instead of the prime matter that 
accompanies substantial form on the hylemorphic theory, she proposed content as 
that on which structure operates to produce a structured whole. I have criticised 
her view elsewhere,63 primarily on the ground of its being subject to what I call 
the ‘content-fixing problem’, which concerns the impossibility in principle of 
choosing any particular content as the content on which structure is imposed to 
constitute a substance. What, for instance, is the content on which equine 
structure operates to constitute a horse? For different contents, whether it be 
flesh and bones, cells, atoms, quarks, there will be a different structure, and yet 
there is no reason in principle to choose one over the other. 
There is, however, another problem for structure-based hylemorphism, 
which I call the ‘qualitative problem’. Related to the content-fixing problem, and 
in a way more fundamental and also explanatory of why the first problem arises, 
the qualitative problem is that most if not all the candidate contents for a 
structural account come too late in the metaphysical analysis to be viable partners 
for any given structure. Certainly, if we restrict ourselves to biological contents, 
whether flesh and bones, organs, biological systems, genes, or DNA itself, they 
are all already defined by the organism to which they belong before structure even 
                                            
62 Koslicki (2008). 
63 Oderberg (2013). 
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comes on the scene to organise them into a substantial whole. No structure 
imposed on, say, equine organs can explain any unity beyond the unity of those 
specific organs. The unity within each organ is left unexplained: and yet each 
organ is already defined as an equine organ before64 the proposed equine structure 
does any work. The unity problem, however, is a problem concerning the whole 
substance, including all of its biological parts: in virtue of what are they all united 
into an organic substantial whole? Structural hylemorphism cannot answer this 
question.  
 
5. Conclusion 
For traditional hylemorphism only substantial form penetrates, in its unifying 
power, to every element of the organic substantial whole. It leaves no aspect of 
unity in need of further explanation. This is why the traditional hylemorphist 
holds, for example, that there is as much of the substantial form of humanity in 
my little finger as there is in me as an individual human being. The difference, 
however, is that as an organ my little finger abtains my substantial form, whereas 
I possess it. The unifying power of the form nevertheless descends to my finger as 
much as it does to any other part of me and as much as it determines me, as a 
whole, as the kind of thing that I am. 
To reiterate, substantial form is a metaphysical posit, not the subject of 
an empirical hypothesis. It is not ‘something we know not what’ that is vacuously 
postulated to explain unity. It is what we must have if unity is to be explained. If 
this is hard for biologists and/or philosophers to swallow, it is because both have 
                                            
64 In the metaphysical sense of ‘before’, of course, not the temporal. 
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abandoned the quest for a genuine philosophy of nature that combines scientifically-
informed metaphysics with metaphysically-informed science. An adequate 
philosophy of nature will resist the wild flights of fancy found in superorganism 
theory, which undermines organismic unity from both ends – blurring the 
boundaries both between organisms and collectives and between organisms and 
their parts. If D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson was right that the unity of the 
organism is a fundamental truth requiring explanation, then only substantial 
form can claim to be the ‘great unifier’ that does the work that needs to be done. 
With this, I can cite the agreement of another Thompson – William R. Thompson 
(1887-1972), one-time research scientist at the Imperial Institute of Entomology 
and Fellow of the Royal Society – who said: 
In the unification of a multiplicity, with reference to a specific end, the 
organism resembles a machine; but it is not, like the machine, unified by 
the participated activity of a separate mover. It moves itself, and what we 
call "physico- chemical properties" or "cytological activities" are simply 
the living unit envisaged in abstracto at various levels. They are not true 
nonliving or nonorganismal agglomerates unified and moved by 
something higher. There is nothing to move them but the thing they 
constitute; in other words, nothing to move them but themselves.65 
By this, Thompson means that the unity of an organism’s parts does not derive 
from anything external to the organism. The organism moves its parts, but only 
because it moves itself. And it moves itself because of its unity as a single 
                                            
65 Thompson (1947): 154. 
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substance. I happily side with both Thompsons in regarding form as the only 
thing that can make this possible.66 
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